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Global Agricultural Reform and U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Capacity
1. Introduction
Despite the broad consensus of the recent economics literature that global agricultural
policy reform can yield substantial welfare gains for all countries (eg., Diao, et al. 2001;
World Bank, 2001; Tokarick, 2003), agricultural reform poses a serious obstacle for
multilateral and many regional trade negotiations.   Why do countries resist what is “good
for them”?  Although global reforms can lead to an improvement in national welfare, or
gains in aggregate consumer purchasing power, policy-makers are often more responsive
to the concerns that are vociferously expressed by those who expect to lose from policy
reform.  Their expected losses are based on the short-term and long-term costs of
adjustment to a new economic environment.
Agricultural households adjust to shocks such as policy reform through market
mechanisms, reallocating their production mix, and adjusting their labor inputs and
investment on- and off-farm.  Farm households’ capacity to adjust through market
mechanisms will influence their level of gains or losses from global reform.  Potential
losers are likely to lobby for compensation or trade adjustment assistance linked to a
multi-lateral proposal.
Trade adjustment assistance (TAA) programs have been used in the U.S. for more than
four decades to make trade reform possible by offering to facilitate adjustment. The
introduction of the U.S. TAA program and its subsequent expansions have all been linked
to passage of trade negotiation authority or trade agreements.
2  The 2002 Trade Act
includes trade adjustment benefits for farmers for the first time (see box). TAA programs
mainly compensate workers and firms for short-term adjustment costs, through
unemployment benefits, re-training, and relocation  and technical assistance.
3
Three broad justifications have been made for a government role in trade adjustment.
Richardson (1980) described these in terms of easing transition, compensating injury and
bleeding political pressure for protectionism.  Others have explored the efficiency and
equity objectives of trade adjustment assistance (Aho and Bayard, 1984; Brander and
Spencer, 1994; Magee, 2001).  Adjustment programs can promote market efficiency by
improving the capacity of workers and firms to adjust to trade shocks.  Sticky adjustment
matters because it results in a nation’s output falling below its productive capacity - a real
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President Kennedy with the authority to enter into the Kennedy Round of the GATT negotiations.  NAFTA
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loss that must be subtracted from the expected gains from trade reforms.  Adjustment
programs can be used to achieve distributional equity by compensating those who expect
to lose most from policies, regardless of their capacity to adjust.  Compensation linked to
the expected size of loss may reflect notions about equity – that a few should not bear an
unfair share of the costs of a policy change that benefits many – and it can help to target
benefits toward those most likely to oppose reform. Adjustment policy design involves
striking a balance between efficiency and equity objectives in the distribution of program
benefits (Brander and Spencer, 1994).
Global agricultural reform can potentially lead to aggregate gains for U.S. agriculture; but
adjustment issues likely will be important in the trade policy debate because of the
prospects for both winners and losers within the sector.  The equity and efficiency
concepts that underlie adjustment policy design can be used to focus a distributional
analysis of the expected gains and losses linked to global reform and the adjustment
capacity of U.S. agriculture.  In this paper, we develop a macro-micro model of the U.S.
to simulate the effects of world price changes from global agricultural policy reform.  We
use the model to describe the diversity in U.S. farm households’ exposure to the shock
and in their capacity to adjust using measures of heterogeneous human capital adjustment
capacity.   In this analysis, we focus on the distributional aspects of the adjustment
capacity of farm households, linked to their differential endowments of human capital.
We develop ex ante measures of adjustment capacity across farm household types, using
as proxies the probability of the operator working off-farm and the farm operator’s
managerial capacity to successfully respond to and compensate for changing relative
prices. This paper is a part of a larger program of research on trade adjustment and U.S.
agriculture.
Box – Provisions of Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers
TAA for farmers was introduced under the 2002 Trade Adjustment Reform Act.  It provides
producers of raw commodities, who have been adversely affected by import competition, free
technical assistance and cash benefits up to $10,000 per year. TAA covers farmers, ranchers, fish
farmers and fishermen competing with aqua-culture products.  Complainants must petition the
USDA Foreign Agriculture Service on behalf of regional or national producers in their sectors,
who may then apply individually for benefits.  To be eligible, producer prices in the previous
marketing year must be less than or equal to 80 percent of the national average price during the
previous 5 marketing years, and imports of like or competitive products must have contributed
importantly to the demonstrated decline in farm income. Producers whose average adjusted gross
income is under $2.5 million and who have received their free technical assistance from the
Extension Service may receive up to $10,000 per year, but no more than $65,000 in combined
counter-cyclical and TAA payments.  The amount of cash payment will be equal to the quantity
produced in the most recent marketing year multiplied by one-half the difference between the
average price in the most recent marketing year and 80 percent of the average price for the 5
preceding marketing years.  Payments may be available in subsequent years if imports keep
increasing and prices remain below the 80-percent threshold. As of April 2004, 12 petitions have
been approved.  These cover Maine blueberries, Florida lychees, and salmon, shrimp and catfish
producers in certain affected areas.  Thirteen petitions were rejected, including applications for
Virginia apples, California oranges, and national rice.  More information on the program is
available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/taa/taaindex.htm4
2. Global Agricultural Policy Reform: Impacts and Capacity to Adjust
Price and Trade Impacts of Global Reform
World agricultural markets are highly distorted by the widespread use of agricultural
tariffs, domestic support and export subsidies.  Economy-wide analyses concur that
global agricultural reform could lead to substantial gains in world welfare, ranging from
$56 billion to $248 billion annually (Diao, et al., 2001; Tokarick, 2003; World Bank,
2001.). There is a consensus that most of the gains from global liberalization are
attributable to market access (tariff and non-tariff trade barriers) reforms.
Differences in the magnitude of expected welfare impacts reflect the real-life complexity
of multilateral agricultural negotiations, particularly with respect to domestic support.
The WTO measures domestic subsidies in an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). The
AMS includes only those domestic subsidies subject to expenditure limits under global
trade rules.  It excludes subsidies that are considered to be minimally production-
distorting (e.g., decoupled income support, environmental programs, food distribution
programs, and subsidies that are offset by supply constraints) and “de minimus” support
that does not exceed 5 percent of the members’ total value of production (10 percent for
developing countries).  Many studies simulate the elimination of domestic subsidies in
addition to those included in the AMS, and model different kinds of farmer payments as
having identical incentive effects on production.
4
In this paper, we follow the partial-equilibrium analysis of global reform reported in
Cooper, et al. (2003).
5   In contrast to economy-wide, global models, this agriculture-
focused model has a more disaggregated coverage of agricultural sectors, and it accounts
for differences among types of domestic support in the WTO constraints placed on the
program and in their production incentives.  It describes a “zero-zero-zero” (0-0-0) global
reform scenario in which global tariffs, export subsidies, and the AMS are reduced to
zero.  Programs in the U.S. AMS include marketing loan benefits and commodity interest
subsidies. Non-product-specific payments, such as market loss assistance payments, have
not been included in the U.S. AMS because they have remained below 5 percent of the
value of aggregate U.S. production.
In this stylized scenario, U.S. producers realize net benefits from global reform.
Increased foreign demand due to tariff removal raises world prices, which reduces U.S.
market price support.  Higher world prices more than offset the impacts of fully
eliminating the U.S. AMS (table 1).  Aggregate returns to U.S. agricultural producers will
                                                
4  Diao, et al., accounted for the differential incentive effects of policies and they removed only domestic
subsidies facing WTO expenditure limits (but included de minimus), which contributed to their smaller
estimated welfare impacts from reform.
5 Cooper, et al. describe results from a simulation by James V. Stout, at USDA-ERS, of global agricultural
policy reform using the ERS-Penn State global mode.  The model is documented in Stout (2004), found at:
http://trade.aers.psu.edu/.5
increase by 4%, with declining returns only for producers of rice and dairy products.
However, achieving these aggregate gains for agriculture will require sectoral
readjustment of U.S. agriculture.  Producers make this adjustment through resource
reallocation and diversification, as they change their farm’s mix of production activities
when relative prices change. Aggregate production of corn, other coarse grains, and
poultry will increase, with declining production of rice, wheat, soybeans, beef, and dairy
products.
Table 1 – Simulated changes in U.S. production,  prices and returns to producers








Rice -1.2 13.2 -0.8
Wheat -0.1 4.8 2.5
Corn 2.4 16.5 13.9
Other coarse grains 1.7 13.5 10.9
Soybeans -0.7 7.5 3.9
Cotton 0.0 4.5 2.1
Beef and veal -0.1 10.6 8.1
Pork 0.0 7.5 5.0
Poultry meat 1.6 13.0 10.5
Butter -15.0 -12.0 -12.0
Cheese -0.6 -1.9 -1.9
Non-fat dry milk -15.0 -1.6 -1.6
Whole dry milk -31.6 -13.4 -13.4
Total 0.27 9.19 4.2
Source:  ERS/Penn State World Trade model, reported in Cooper, et al., 2003.
From a political perspective, the issues raised by a multilateral reform that results in
expected net gains are different from one that results in expected net losses.  From an
economic perspective, the trade adjustment process is similar whether the shock is
positive or negative.  The capacity to offset losses and to take advantage of emerging
market opportunities is distributed heterogeneously across the U.S. farm sector, with
some farms better able to avert the losses or garner the rents from trade reform than
others.
The shocks from the ERS-Penn State model, described in Cooper, et al., will affect U.S.
farm households differently.  Shocks will vary according to how farm households are
situated with respect to production mix and dependence on farm subsidies as well as the
role of farm activities in the farm household income and asset portfolio.  We attempt to
capture the diversity in impacts of trade reform on both farm production activities and
farm household well-being, by describing farms and households using a 7-way typology.
This typology categorizes households according to the primary occupation of the farm
operator, and size of sales.
6
                                                
6  The typology is described in Hoppe, Perry and Banker (2000).  The Farm Income and Costs Briefing
Room (http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmIncome/) provides a comprehensive description of farm
households in the farm typology. The distribution of farm households among these seven types, along with
data for their on- and off-farm sources of income are discussed further in Hanson and Somwaru (2003).6
There are notable differences across farm households with respect to their exposure to
farm-related income shocks, and some of these are offsetting (table 2).  For instance, very
large farms receive more farm subsidies compared to other types of farms, and in a 0-0-0
reform would lose nearly $6000 on average, compared to an average payment reduction
of $50 on retirement farms.  But when normalized to cents per dollar of production,
residential and farm occupation farm types are most dependent on farm subsidies.
Commercial farms (high sales, large and very large farms) are more dependent on the
farm operation as a source of household income and assets than other types of farms
(table 3).  However, they are less reliant on owned program acres in their farm operation
than other types of farmers, and are therefore less exposed to changes in land asset values
linked to subsidy reform.  Moreover, larger farms are somewhat more diversified across
agricultural enterprises within their farm business compared to limited resource, retired,
and rural residence farms.  Limited resource, retirement, residential and low sales farms
diversify in other dimensions, as seen by their high share of nonfarm income and wealth
in their overall portfolios.
Diversification across production mix and across income and assets allows households to
balance the risk and returns associated with different economic activities.  The production
and income/asset diversification observed today represents actions taken in the past to
balance profit and utility objectives with other goals, such as security, lifecycle planning,
and possibly non-pecuniary preferences.  Diversification can reflect past as well as
anticipatory adjustments, such as the expectation of global agricultural reform.   For the
household, “pull” factors from local job markets and accessibility to these jobs also
contribute to diversification. When farms and households are already diversified, then
marginal changes in allocations across their economic activities can be presumed to be
less costly than the initial entry, which might entail search costs, entry or training fees,
and perhaps higher perceived levels of risk.  The absence of diversification does not
necessarily mean that it could not occur, only that adjustment may be more difficult than
for already diversified farms and households.
                                                                                                                                                
Table 2 – Incidence of payment loss across farm types due to 0-0-0-global reform









Thousands $US million $US US cents
Limited resource 127 9 69 0.57
Retirement 298 14 46 0.83
Residential/lifestyle 931 75 81 1.00
Farm occupation/low sales 480 161 336 1.17
Farm occupation/high sales 175 343 1955 1.20
Large 77 309 4000 0.45
Very large 58 341 5833 0.79
All 2,147 1,252 583 0.79
Source:  ARMS, 1999 and ERS-USDA CGE model.7


















Limited resource 0.05 34.6 44.5 50.9
Retirement 0.05 49.7 48.8 51.8
Residential/lifestyle 0.06 41.2 47.1 52.0
Farm occupation/low sales 0.11 41.3 64.4 49.1
Farm occupation/high sales 0.19 30.0 74.8 32.8
Large 0.19 27.6 72.8 29.8
Very large 0.14 30.7 71.4 24.4
All 0.09         40.7 54.9        48.2
1/ The entropy index measures diversification among all production activities on the farm, based
on the value of output.  An entropy value approaching zero means the farm is nearly a
monoculture, and a value approaching one implies equal shares across all commodities.
Source:  ARMS, 1999 and ERS-USDA CGE model.
Adjustment Capacity in U.S. Agriculture
Trade adjustment is the reallocation of productive resources in response to the relative
price, income and wealth changes linked to trade policy reforms. If they can, producers
and households will shift resources away from production, employment, or investment in
sectors where returns are falling, and into the sectors where returns are rising.  The
process of adjustment can create both short-term and long-term costs.  Short-term costs
are those related to loss of income to owners of fixed resources – human, land and capital
– that are unemployed or idled until they are re-employed in new production activities.
Short-term costs also include one-time adjustment costs such as training and moving
expenses for new employment.  Short-term costs are those for which TAA programs have
traditionally attempted to compensate.
Another policy concern is potential long-term adjustment costs, when resources
permanently earn less following reemployment.  These losses can accumulate over the
long term, or be capitalized immediately after a shock.  For example, an immediate loss
in land asset values following a shock can be thought of as a long-term loss, in which the
market capitalizes the long-run declines in expected market returns and/or changes in
subsidy benefits linked to land ownership or operation.  A focus on long-term losses in
asset values is a feature that differentiates recent U.S. domestic farm policy reforms from
both farm and non-farm trade adjustment programs.
7
                                                
7  The 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act eliminated the peanut program’s marketing
quotas, providing lump sum buy-out payments to holders of peanut quotas, regardless of whether owners
actually farmed or rented out their quota rights (Dohlman, Hoffman and Young , 2003; Wills, 2002).
Proposals for a tobacco buy-out program all include lump sum payments to marketing quota holders
(Capehart, 2002).  In both the peanut and tobacco markets, marketing quotas are tradable assets largely
owned by individuals who do not actively farm.  Also, the alternative TAA program in the 2002 TAA8
Adjustment capacity determines the size and duration of adjustment costs.  In this paper,
we consider two dimensions of potential adjustment capacity in U.S. agriculture to global
policy shocks.  The first is through changes in household labor allocations across farm
and nonfarm labor, and leisure.  For those operators and spouses who specialize in on-
farm work, changes in farm wage and income will affect farm hours worked versus
leisure or home time.  Households in which farm operators already hold off-farm jobs
have more flexibility to compensate for any changes in wages in one job by reallocating
hours worked from one job to the other, as well as to changes in leisure and home time.
What characteristics make it likely that a household will be successful in making labor
market adjustments? A large body of empirical research describes labor market
adjustment to structural shocks in non-farm sectors.  These analyses show the importance
of demographic characteristics in determining the likelihood that an individual will
successfully find reemployment following a loss of job or reduction in wages.  Kletzer’s
(1998) review of recent literature on job displacement reported that higher education,
younger age, low job tenure and non-minority race made reemployment more likely.
Education is a critical factor, with a college education associated with significantly higher
rates of reemployment compared to a high school education (Farber, 2003).  Kletzer
(2002) described the persistent, long-term losses faced by workers displaced specifically
because of imports.   Re-employed, import-competing workers on average lost 13 percent
in earnings in their new jobs.  Two-thirds earned less in their new job than in their old,
and one-quarter lost 30 percent or more of their former wage.  Tenure in the lost job
makes it far more likely that a worker will face a permanent income loss, or long-term
adjustment costs.  Long-term job experience creates industry-specific human capital that
generates wage premiums that cannot be recouped in a new industry.  Tenure is also
associated with length of unemployment.  Some causes may be that more tenured
workers are less likely to search for jobs in new industries, and their longer tenure may
lead to a greater propensity to sit out what they perceive to be cyclical bad spells in their
sector (Fallick, 1996).
Gardner (1992) describes a similar labor adjustment process in agriculture in response to
long-term technological change, focusing on the human capital and tenure aspects of
adjustment. “The difference between the farm and off-farm value of farm-specific skills
is not an adjustment cost in the same sense as the costs of job search or moving
expenses...The loss in earnings differs from adjustment costs in that the loss of specific-
skill returns is not just a one-time cost.  Rather the loss occurs continuously as the
earnings difference cumulates over the period during which the farm-specific human
capital would have depreciated if the worker had remained on the farm.”  The implication
is that “the farm population should tend to become older as the demand for farm labor
declines.  Younger people have a longer period over which to recover the fixed
adjustment costs, and will have less experience-derived specific human capital to lose.”
(p. 75)
                                                                                                                                                
Reform Act focuses on long-term losses by providing reemployed workers age 50 or older with a wage
subsidy that partially compensates for lower wages in their new job for a period of up to two years.  For
details, see the legislation at:    http://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/directives/107PL210.cfm.9
The demographic characteristics of U.S. farmer operators suggest that for some, these
labor adjustment costs could be high, based on their average length of tenure, although
many already work off-farm (table 4).  Across the farm typology, commercial farmers
tend to be slightly younger than average, with fewer years experience on the farm,
however, their labor is specialized with a relatively small share working any off-farm
hours. Residential and lifestyle farmers are the youngest group, are relatively well-
educated, with the highest off-farm job participation.



















Indicator No. of years Percent Percent
Limited resource 54 1 26 22 41
Retirement 69 2 33 10 29
Residential/lifestyle 48 2 19 49 74
Farm occupation/low sales 59 1 32 24 46
Farm occupation/high sales 50 2 25 21 43
Large 49 2 25 19 36
Very large 49 2 25 15 35
Total 54 2 36 35 55
1/ A value of 1 for education indicates high school or GED; a value of 2 indicates some college
education.
2/  Probability is calculated using ARMS, 1999, based on Ahearn et al., (2002), which includes farm and
labor market characteristics in addition to the demographic variables in this table.
Source:  ARMS, 1999 and ERS calculations based on Ahearn, et al. 2002.
Our analysis develops an ex ante measure of labor adjustment capacity across farm
household types, using as a proxy the probability of the operator working off-farm
estimated by Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre (2002).  Their analysis describes the role of
demographic characteristics including age and education of the operator and off-farm
employment of the spouse.  They also account for farm characteristics including capital
intensity of the farm and government payments; and pull factors including labor market
conditions within the farm commuting zone.  The advantages of using this probability
measure as a proxy for labor adjustment capacity in our micro-analysis is that it captures
the potential for an individual farmer to adjust across labor markets following a shock,
whether or not the operator already works off-farm. A high probability of working off-
farm implies a stronger potential farm labor response to both positive and negative farm
price shocks, and therefore a greater capacity to adjust farm output in response to price
signals.
Across the farm typology, residential and lifestyle farmers are most likely to work off
farm, and retirement farms are least likely to do so.  Operators of very large farms are
least likely to work off farm, based on their demographic, farm, and urban job
environment characteristics.10
The second adjustment mechanism we consider is through the exercise of a farm
operator’s managerial capacity to successfully respond to and compensate for changing
relative prices.  Recent research based on ARMS data has identified characteristics of
farmers that are strongly associated with aspects of farm management skill.
8  El-Osta and
Morehart (1999) found that age, education, and the share of labor hours in farming were
positively correlated with adoption of management- and capital- intensive technologies in
dairy.  McBride and El-Osta (2002) found that age and education were positively
correlated with the adoption of genetically modified corn, and number of years in farming
was negatively correlated.
In this paper, we argue that demonstrated high
financial performance in farming is a likely
predictor of the farmer’s managerial capacity to
adjust to changing market conditions linked to
reform.  Ideally, such management capacity
could be explained by the underlying
characteristics of the farm and farm operator.
We use a proxy measure of high financial
performance based on total economic costs of
production relative to total value of agricultural
output.  This general measure of financial
efficiency allows potential farm adjustment to
occur through a range of mechanisms, such as changes in production mix, changes in
scale of production, and adoption of technological and managerial innovations.  This
approach shows clear differences across farm types in the financial efficiency of their
operations (table 5).
9  Large farms are more efficient than small ones, suggesting the
importance of scale in explaining farm success.  Very large farms are more efficient than
91 percent of farms, while limited resource, lifestyle, and retirement farms are the least
efficient.
4.  Macro-micro Simulation of Global Agricultural Reform with U.S. Adjustment Capacity
                                                
8 The Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) is the USDA’s primary vehicle for data
collection on farm households.  The survey includes data on farm household characteristics, resource use
and costs, and farm financial farm conditions.
9 Based on ARMS, 1999.  Full resource ownership costs include cash costs and non-cash costs to the farm
operation, measured separately for each observation (household) in the data.  Cash costs are outlays
incurred by the operation to produce commodities and are dependent on production practices and the prices
and quantities of inputs.  Non-cash costs include opportunity costs of owned assets land, the capital
recovery of machinery and equipment, and unpaid operator labor.  Methods used in constructing costs and
returns are endorsed by the American Agricultural Economics Association (AAEA, 2000) and can also be
found on the ERS website at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/CostsAndReturns/ .  For each observation in the
data, full resource ownership costs are divided by the total value of production, yielding a new variable
called "financial efficiency." We used the cumulative distribution of financial efficiency across all farms to
proxy any individual household' s likely success in farming in response to changes in relative commodity
prices.  Values range from zero (the highest level of financial efficiency and the highest likelihood of
success) to one (the lowest level of financial efficiency and the least likelihood of success).
Table 5 – Probability of high farm
financial performance, by typology
Farm type Percentile
distribution
Limited resource   .43
Retirement .39
Residential/lifestyle .40
Farm occupation/low sales .52




Source:  ARMS, 1999.11
The Macro-Model
We develop a macro-micro simulation model to analyze the distributional impacts of a
global agricultural policy reform.  The macro analysis is based on a U.S. CGE model
developed and maintained at USDA-ERS (Hanson, 2002).
10  Households are segmented
into 7 representative farm types, and non-farm household categories.
11 The CGE
framework allows us to capture economy-wide impacts on farm and non-farm activities
from trade reform.  The micro-simulation model distributes the equilibrium changes from
the macro model on household income, farm labor, non-farm labor, and taxes from 7
representative household types in the CGE model to the individual farm households
described by ARMS.  In the micro-simulation model, we introduce heterogeneity in labor
adjustment capacity and farm success to describe the distribution of impacts across
individual farm households within each typology.  The contribution of the micro-
simulation is to show variability within each of the 7 groups and therefore among all farm
households.
The CGE is rich in detailed specification of industry, labor, and households.  Households
receive income from three main sources: earnings both from wages and salaries and from
self-employment; capital income from the ownership of assets–dividends, interest, and
rent; and transfer income from government programs. Households use their income to
consume goods and services, pay taxes, and save.  Labor supply and demand are treated
with occupational detail. Only farm households supply “farm operator” as an occupation,
while all households, including farm households, supply labor by the operator and the
spouse to a number of other occupations.  Similarly, each industry demands labor in its
own unique mix of occupations.  Model closure rules direct the impact of a policy change
to take the form of a change in household real income rather than changes in the trade
balance, real investment, and the government deficit.  These closure rules allow the
model to produce a measure of change to household well-being.
Each farm household type produces its own mix of agricultural commodities, based on
ARMS data. Farm income includes coupled program payments that are tied to the
production of specific commodities, and decoupled payments that are treated as
government transfers to farm households.  Income from farm sectors accounts for
payments to hired labor and payments to non-operator owners of farm assets. The
distribution of subsidies among farm households is in proportion to their production of
the program commodities.  Farm households adjust their production activities in response
to changes in the farm income (self-employed earnings) they receive by commodity.
We simulate the stylized 0-0-0 scenario of agricultural policy reform from the ERS-Penn
State model, reported in Cooper, et al., by introducing its world price results as
exogenous shocks to the U.S. model and reducing program payments.  Farms adjust their
production mix by re-allocating resources to those production activities that would get the
most benefit from the reform.  Increased returns to agriculture lead to higher farm wages,
                                                
10 This version of the model is described in detail in Hanson and Somwaru (2003).
11  Household data are drawn from U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau , Current
Population Survey (CPS) and ARMS.12
which give an incentive to the farm household to increase labor employed in agriculture,
despite the loss of subsidy benefits. The net effect of the 0-0-0 reform is to increase total
farm household income, our measure of household well-being, by $500 million (table 6).
Higher world prices for some products, and the capacity of farm households to reallocate
their production enable them to more than fully offset their loss in farm payments due to
the reform.   
The distributional impacts across the farm typology from a change in farm commodity
programs includes the change in government program payments, taxes that would have
been paid to fund the program payments, and the impact of price changes to the cost of
household food purchases.  The greatest income gains accrue to residential and lifestyle
farms.  These are the farms with the most part-time spousal employment.  They therefore
have the greatest capacity for labor substitution in the macro-model, and the largest on-
farm labor supply response.  They also tend to specialize in beef production, for which
market prices rise in this simulation.
Table 6 – U.S. farm household impacts from a zero-zero-zero global agricultural policy reform


















Limited resources -0.009 0.006 0.009 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.004
Retirement -0.014 0.046 0.017 -0.005 0.003 -0.006 0.041
Residential/lifestyle -0.075 0.148 0.096 -0.021 0.003 -0.010 0.141
Farm occupation low sales -0.161 0.087 0.179 -0.011 0.003 -0.010 0.087
Farm occupation high sales -0.343 0.059 0.376 -0.008 0.000 -0.006 0.078
Large -0.309 0.042 0.338 -0.006 0.000 -0.004 0.061
Very large -0.341 0.084 0.338 -0.009 0.000 -0.004 0.068
All farms -1.252 0.471 1.353 -0.058 .010 -0.040 0.484
Micro-simulation model
In the micro-simulation model, we combine the results from the macro-model reported in
table 6 with characteristics of U.S. farm households, using survey data from the 1999
ARMS, a representative base year.  The benefit of household unit-level survey data is its
ability to show the distributional effects of a trade policy shock.  Regardless of the
objectives set for an adjustment policy that accompanies policy reform, targeting
individual households rather than all households or even all producers of a specific
commodity can improve policy performance. Policy design can take advantage of micro-
data on both impact and adjustment heterogeneity.
We construct two scenarios showing the distribution of household-level impacts within
each typology.  Both scenarios correspond to the same general equilibrium response to
policy reform found in table 6 for each representative household type.  The two micro-
simulation scenarios differ in how they include household unit-specific information to
distribute the net impacts from policy reform. The first scenario uses information only on
heterogeneity on the incidence of payment removal, or the payment “shock index”.  The
second scenario used an “adjustment index,” which combines information on13
heterogeneity in the incidence of payment removal with information on how adjustment
capacity varies across the population.
12
The micro-simulation Scenario 1 simply indexes all adjustment undertaken by
households by the size of the payment shock each household receives.  The behavioral
assumption underlying the shock-indexed scenario is that adjustment response is
proportional to the level of payment shock received by the household.  Ex-ante, farm
households receiving a large subsidy will adjust more than farm households receiving a
small subsidy, and farm households that did not receive a payment will not respond at all.
Proportional response is likely to capture the first-order effects of the 0-0-0 policy reform
scenario because the type of payments removed in the scenario are based on the actual
level of production of specific commodities by recipient households.  For example, the
size of marketing loan benefits received by a farm household is proportional to output of
specific commodities, and translates into the removal of a per-unit price wedge that
favors the produced commodity over all others.  In contrast, households that did not
produce the supported commodities are not affected by removal of the subsidy price
wedge.
The source of variability highlighted in the adjustment-indexed scenario describes, in
addition, differences among households in their opportunities to engage in alternative
enterprises.  Specifically, the set of skills and abilities held by farm operators and other
household members are not identically distributed; nor do all regions of the country offer
suitable farm and non-farm alternatives to households seeking to regain ex-ante levels of
well-being after a policy reform. In micro-simulation Scenario 2, we represent
heterogeneity in households’ adjustment capacity by constructing an adjustment index
based on firm, household and local labor market attributes that we expect to play an
important role in adjustment.  We calculate an adjustment index that includes the
household-specific level of government payments (as in the shock index), and in addition
includes household-specific information on the probability of the operator working-off
farm and the probability of successful farming (financial efficiency).
Box and whisker plots (figure 1) show the distribution of outcomes associated with the 0-
0-0 policy reform under both the shock-indexed and adjustment-indexed scenarios.  The
plots show the variation in impacts across households within each typology.  Each box
contains the range within the first and third quartile of impacts, while the whisker extends
to 1.5 times the size of the box. The whisker does not extend to the left into negative
territory because both farm and non-farm income increases in the scenario modeled in the
0-0-0 policy reform.  In other words, all farms within each typology share at least in part
in the gains from reform and there are no net losers as a result.  (Distributing outcomes to
households based on changes in returns to the specific products that they produce would
allow us to identify both winners and losers; this aspect of our distributional analysis is
an important next step in this research program.)
                                                
12 See the appendix for the mechanics of the simulation itself as well as the some numerical examples.   14
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Figure 2. Change in Total Household Incomes


















intuitive, although recall that both scenarios have the same aggregate impacts.  A
comparison of outliers (figure 2) with the box and whisker plots (figure 1) demonstrates
the key feature of the adjustment-indexed scenario and why it actually results in greater
variability in outcomes than in the shock-indexed scenario. That is, when observations
outside the whisker are included (figure 2), two things become clear.  First, it is the
outlier observations that are responsible for much of the aggregate impacts in both
scenarios.  In three of the seven typology types, some outliers record net income impacts


















household with an above-average adjustment index will garner more than they would
have if response followed only the size of the payments removed.  In effect, households15
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Figure 3.  Inequality in Changes in Household Income
with below-average adjustment capacity give up their gains to households with above-
average adjustment capacity.  This “division of the spoils” functions in much the same
way that later adopters give up some of their rents to early adopters when a new
technology is introduced.  With such large gains by a few farms within a group there
remain fewer rents
available for other
farms also affected by
the reform scenario.
A generalized Lorenz
curve (figure 3) gives
a better idea of the
distributional impacts





example, in the shock-
indexed scenario, 40
percent of the gains
from policy reform are
shared among 80 percent of the farm population that received payments, meaning that 60
percent of the gains from policy reform were shared among only 20 percent of the
population. In the adjustment-indexed scenario, less than 30 percent of the gains were
shared among 80 percent of the farm population, and the remaining 70 percent of the
gains were shared among 20 percent of the farm population.  Changes in income
distribution and equality within the U.S. agricultural sector, based on heterogeneous
adjustment capacity,
presents another
aspect of equity issues
that could enter the
debate on agricultural
adjustment to trade
reform.  The potential




rents also offers some
insight into the
drivers of structural
change in the sector.
Finally, we consider gains and losses linked to the production mix of the farm operation.
Figure 4 describes changes in income across the typology, with losses associated with16
production of food grains and the aggregate “other” sector, and gains in income
associated with production of feedcrops, livestock and other commodities.  Differences in
impacts of reform associated with the initial production mix and the ability to diversify
within the farm operation is a key aspect of the distributional impacts of reform at the
household level.  Linking sectors in farm operations to changes in income at the
household level represents the next step forward in our macro-micro simulation project.
5.  Conclusions
Global reform offers significant opportunities for U.S. agricultural producers and farm
households because the stimulus to foreign demand for U.S. products can offset losses of
U.S. farm payments.  But even with prospects for net gains, adjustment to policy reform
is likely to remain an important element in the trade policy debate because U.S. farm
households are diverse, both in their exposure to policy reform shocks and in their
capacity to adjust to changing market conditions.  This paper focuses on the
heterogeneous distribution of adjustment capacity linked to human capital to describe the
impacts of global reform on U.S. agriculture.  We developed two measures of human
capital to describe adjustment capacity: probability of off-labor worker and farm financial
management skills.
Policy makers will define the equity and efficiency goals set in any adjustment policy.
Regardless of the balance of objectives that are set, policy design can be informed by
analysis that identifies the farm households who are most likely to be impacted by the
trade reforms, and that accounts for heterogeneity in their ability to take compensating
actions.  The characteristics that may define these farm households are likely to be not
only their farm’s production mix and current program benefits, but also the household’s
demographic characteristics such as age, education, and managerial capacity, and their
access to alternative employment.   An emphasis on individual adjustment capacity rather
than industry is consistent with new directions in non-farm trade adjustment programs;
some new benefits are being tied to the worker’s age, and they are not dependent on the
sector in which he or she is newly employed (Kletzer and Litan, 2001).
This paper is part of a larger program of work on the distribution of trade adjustment
shocks and adjustment capacity in U.S. agriculture.  There are other aspects of trade
shocks and adjustment that present important additional areas for research in this
program.  Defining the links between farm households and their specialization in sectors
affected by trade reform; and describing ownership of fixed assets, particularly of
farmland, can provide a more disaggregated perspective on the household distribution of
income and asset shocks.  Incorporating adjustment mechanisms directly into the macro-
simulation is another objective of this project.  In addition to the adjustment capacity
measures included in this analysis, farm households have other ways to adjust to and
cope with change. They make dynamic adjustments by changing their savings and
investment behavior in response to changes in income, asset values, and wealth.  The age
of household members is linked to life-cycle considerations, and within-household
dynamics also influence the way that households are likely to adjust.  Understanding the
ways that U.S. farm households adjust in an economy-wide approach, and the flexibilities17
and constraints that characterize different households, can contribute to a more realistic
debate on the benefits and costs of domestic and global policy reform.18
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Appendix:  Scenario construction
For both scenarios, the first step is to translate Table 5 factor shocks into terms relative to
the quantity of payments removed.  This is accomplished by normalizing the endogenous
effects on household indicators (farm labor, other household income, tax relief, and total
household income, found in columns 2-5, respectively) by the amount of government
payments removed (found in column 1).  This normalization (shown in Table 6) will
allow us to express impacts relative to the quantity of payments removed.  For example,
for limited resource farms, the farm labor income effect is 0.67 times (or 67 percent of)
the value of government payment removed from limited resource farms. The negative
value indicates that the net effect on farm labor has the opposite net effect on household
income from government payments, which are negative in the reform scenario.
The “shock indexed” scenario is carried out by simply multiplying the quantity of
government payments removed as a result of policy reform.  If $1,000 was received by a
farm household pre-reform, then the net effect on the household from removal of $1,000
can calculated by multiplying columns 1-4 in Table 6 by $1,000 (results seen in Table 7).
Of course, actual payments received varied widely across recipients.
The adjustment index is calculated for each observation in ARMS and consists of two
variables estimated to proxy the ability of a household to reallocate resources, relative to
similar households.  The first variable is an estimate of a household’s ability to reallocate
labor resources in response to a shock through off-farm employment.  The second









Limited resources -0.67 -0.89 0.11 -0.44
Retirement -3.29 -1.07 0.43 -2.93
Residential/lifestyle -1.97 -1.04 0.13 -1.88
Low sales -0.54 -1.06 0.06 -0.54
High sales -0.17 -1.07 0.02 -0.23
Large -0.14 -1.07 0.01 -0.20
Very large -0.25 -0.96 0.01 -0.20
All farms -0.38 -1.04 0.03 -0.39









Limited resources -1000 667 889 -111 444
Retirement -1000 3286 1071 -429 2929
Residential/lifestyle -1000 1973 1040 -133 1880
Low sales -1000 540 1062 -62 540
High sales -1000 172 1073 -17 227
Large -1000 136 1074 -13 197
Very large -1000 246 965 -12 199
All farms -1000 376 1042 -32 38722
variable is an estimate of the farm firm’s ability to reallocate farm-based factors of
production into new or expanded agricultural enterprises, based on their current level of
success.  For each farm household, the adjustment index is calculated as the unweighted
average of the probability that the farm operator will work off of the farm and the
probability that the farm is successful.  The index value is calculated relative to the mean
for each typology.  The mean probability for operators to work off of the farm is reported
in Table 3 (last column) and the mean probability of farming success is found in Table 4.
The adjustment-indexed scenario also uses all information contained in the shock-
indexed scenario.  From the shock-indexed scenario above the example of a $1000 loss of
payments were shown for each typology group. Now we show three additional examples
for a household that differs from the representative household depicted by the typology
group.  Example 1 is the case where the household has 10 percent greater adjustment
capacity than the average for the group.  Net income in each case would be 10 percent
greater than the average impact from the loss of $1000 in payments.  The impact on net
incomes is a constant 10 percent greater, regardless of which typology is used.
Example 2 posits the case where the farm operator’s probability of working off of the
farm is 0.5 and the probability of farming success is 0.9 (i.e. the farm had lower total
economic costs per dollar of output than 90 percent of all farm households.  Because each
typology has a different probability of working off of the farm, and because each
typology on average occupies a different part of the ex-ante distribution of farm success,
the adjustment index is different, although in all cases it is greater than 1 (implying
increased flexibility and adjustment).
Example 3 shows the case of a farm household whose attributes place it with a likelihood
of working off of the farm of 10 percent.  The observation further had a probability of
farming success of 50 percent, meaning the farm’s total costs per dollar of output are at
the median for all farm households.  As in Example 2, the adjustment index varies
depending on which typology contains the household.  As can be seen from these
Table 8.  Net impacts under Adjustment-indexed scenario
Baseline Adjust ind. Income Adjust ind. Income Adjust ind. Income
Limited resources 444 1.1 489 3.46 1538 0.69 308
Retirement 2929 1.1 3221 3.91 11457 0.78 2291
Residential/lifestyle 1880 1.1 2068 3.34 6275 0.67 1255
Low sales 540 1.1 594 2.94 1591 0.59 318
High sales 227 1.1 250 1.43 326 0.29 65
Large 197 1.1 217 1.34 265 0.27 53
Very large 199 1.1 219 1.16 232 0.23 46
All farms 387 1.1 425 2.95 1142 0.59 228
Column 1: Change in total household income from $1000 in payments removed
Example 1: Adjustment index 10 percent greater than typology mean
Example 2: Prob off-farm work = 0.5; Prob of farm success = 0.9
Example 3: Prob off-farm work = 0.1; Prob of farm success = 0.5
Example 2 Example 3 Example 123
examples, including an adjustment index allows for a much greater range of outcomes
than that based on the size of the shock alone.